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1 The utopianism of the new right concerning markets certainly has influenced their views
about how to organise the governance of education, ever since Milton Friedman’s 1955
essay “The role of government in education”. But privatisation of the kind that Friedman
wanted has rarely in fact been tried, the notable exception being the attempt in Chile
under Pinochet, and even there fewer than one half of students were in private schools
one decade after the reforms (Friedman, 1955; Ladd, 2002; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2002).
2 So this essay concentrates on a less commonly discussed utopian feature of the new right
attitude to education. Student-centred education is usually thought of as a utopia of the
left. But it is also, less obviously, a utopia of the right, one which has become remarkably
successful in ways that are little acknowledged. Its dominance not only threatens the
coherence of anything we might reasonably call an “education”, but threatens also the
scope for students to acquire from their education the capacity to think critically. 
 
Student-centred Education
3 The key ideas  may be  summed up from John Darling’s  lucid  account  (Darling,  1994;
Entwistle, 1970). Student-centred education is characterised by:
• an appreciation of children as individuals;
• an awareness of children’s growth and development; and children’s growth is not to be
thought of teleologically, childhood not being a defective version of adulthood;
• the teacher is no more than a “facilitator”.
Hence  the  curriculum is  based  on  freedom,  discovery,  experience  and  creativity,  as
opposed to engaging with a pre-existing body of knowledge to which the teacher is an
authoritative and wise guide.
4 These ideas came to prominence in the early twentieth century as the state expanded its
involvement in education, and their main vehicle was the New Education Fellowship. It
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embraced  many  prominent  educationalists,  including  R.H.  Tawney,  Karl  Mannheim,
Bertrand Russell, Dora Russell, Jean Piaget, John Dewey, Maria Montessori, and A.S. Neill,
who was perhaps the most famous practicising exponent of the ideas. The movement led
to the establishment of various “free schools” in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries, especially in England – for example Abbotsholme, Bedales, Oundle and Beacon
Hill (run by the Russells). The most long-lasting and best-known of these are the Rudolf
Steiner schools  (Mack,  1971).  The intellectual  predecessors of  this  movement include
Froebel, Robert Owen, Rousseau, Comenius, Milton, and Francis Bacon. So it is a line of
educational  thought with a distinguished past,  although until  recently largely among
rebels.
5 Before we move to the Right’s attitudes to these ideas, four comments clarify the specific
ways in which they might be described as radical. The first concerns their romanticism.
They  date  ultimately  from  Rousseau’s  idea  of  childhood,  indeed  his  invention  of
childhood  (Numata,  2003).  Adults  discovered  children  as  different  from  the  late-
eighteenth  century  on,  and,  influenced  by  the  wider  European  reaction  against
rationalism, it came to be believed that metaphors of natural growth were the way in
which child development should be understood (Oelkers, 2002). This was believed to be as
true on moral as on intellectual grounds. It was romantic also in its radical individualism:
for Rousseau society was the source of evil; but it was an individualism of experience, of
the senses, rather than of intellect and will. This romantic view attracted much support
among intellectuals, especially novelists and poets, for example Tolstoy (for example in
the discussion of education in Anna Karenina), Thomas Mann (who sent his son Klaus to
the student-centred Odenwaldschule in Hesse (Mann, 1932)), Shaw (for instance in his
preface  to  Misalliance),  Wells  (Mack,  1971,  p. 266-79)  and,  more  ambivalently,  D.H.
Lawrence (1968).
6 The second comment expands on the importance attached to experience in this theory.
Experience replaced any kind of canon as the source of ideas for the curriculum, and,
indeed,  in the work of  Froebel,  experience was almost mystically venerated (Oelkers,
2002).  A.S.  Neill’s views on the importance of experience for educational practice are
summarised by Darling (1984): all knowledge can and should be related to the experience
of  the pupil;  all  knowledge develops in response to a  human need to cope with the
practical business of living; the divisions between traditional divisions of knowledge (or
“disciplines”) are artificial; and the things which children learn are less important than
the techniques of learning which they acquire. John Dewey said that knowledge is not a
heritage to be passed on but something which learners create for themselves (Darling and
Nisbet,  2000):  knowledge  is  a  continuing  reconstruction  of  experience.  In  this  way
Dewey’s constructivism relates directly to pragmatist philosophy, and hence to utilitarian
conceptions  of  knowledge;  nevertheless,  we  should  note  that  Dewey’s  position  on
student-centredness is complex, as we will see (Carr, 1988).
7 All of these propositions became commonplaces of the student-centred approach. One
of the main pedagogical consequences of this attempt to embed learning in experience
has been “mastery learning” – learning as pursuing behavioural objectives – an approach
invented  by  the  psychologist  Benjamin  Bloom  (Postlethwaite  and  Haggarty,  1998).
Teachers  have  to  break  down  their  course  into  short  units;  each  unit  has  specific
objectives;  teachers  have  to  plan  each  unit  to  take  account  of  pupils’  pre-existing
knowledge and understanding; there has to be a test at the end of each unit; and pupils
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who do  not  pass  the  test  – who  have  not  mastered  the  unit –  are  directed  towards
remedial work. We return to some of the more recent consequences of this later.
8 The third point is about the scientific aspirations of the student-centred project. It was
part of a much grander ambition to render pedagogy scientific, in the English-language
sense (Walkerdine,  1998).  Piaget  argued that  knowing the laws of  mental  and moral
development enables education to act on nature’s ground. If that is so, then teaching
becomes  observation  and  recording  of  natural  development.  There  was  also  a  close
involvement with the early versions of  psychoanalysis (Jenkins,  2000),  the belief  that
childhood innocence can be maintained only by total surveillance. From this then came
the child guidance movement as well as specific pedagogies, and also the importance of
working with whole families,  in particular with mothers (as allegedly the best-placed
person to observe the development of the child). Emerging from that was the sense of
elementary teachers as surrogate mothers. This scientific aspiration accounts in part for
the popularity of the New Education in the democracies in the 1920s and 1930s: it seemed
a rational educational response to the indoctrination and propaganda of the Nazis and
the Soviet Union.
9 The fourth comment is about the suspicion of any kind of schooling and even of teachers
that is to be found among the most radical elements of the student-centred tradition
(Illich, 1973): these were too formal, too imbued with the dominant ideology, and thus too
inclined to prevent the natural growth of the child. That is where, in the less extreme
versions of this theory, the idea of the teacher as “facilitator” came from.
10 In some form, these ideas have had an impact on educational practice throughout the
world, especially the developed world. We will return to some of that impact under right-
wing regimes shortly, but we should note more generally that the ideas have been picked
up almost regardless of the ideological context. The greatest impact has been in the UK,
the USA and northern European countries apart from Germany, although there has also
been significant impact on early years education in France, Italy and Spain: the guiding
philosophy of most policy on school education in these countries, at least since the 1960s,
can be summed up in some widely quoted words of the English Hadow report of 1931,
which is firmly within the new education paradigm: “the curriculum is to be thought of in
terms of activity and experience rather than of knowledge to be acquired and facts to be
stored”.  In  these  countries,  it  has  become the  dominant  ideology in  the  faculties  of
education of the universities, and hence has deeply shaped the theories and practices of
school teachers.
11 What is more, by the mid-twentieth century, student-centred education had become the
normal pedagogical ideology of leftist politics throughout Europe, as part of its hostility
to hierarchy and tradition. Nearly all the writers mentioned earlier have been liberals, at
least in a vague and romantic sense – Neill,  Dewey, Mann, Mannheim, Tawney, Shaw,
Wells, Tolstoy, Rousseau himself. In particular, this ideology was usually not just of the
left but of the anarchist left, becoming a standard part of 1960s liberationist ideology. The
de-schooling  movement  and  the  movement  associated  with  radical  psychoanalysis
became part of the core of that decade’s leftists assumptions. So, for convenience, for the
remainder of this essay, I will refer to the assembly of beliefs that I have been describing
as “left-anarchist progressivism”.
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The Right and Student-centredness
12 Normally,  precisely because of  this  association with the left,  student-centredness has
been subjected to stringent critique from the right. The main criticism has been that
child-centred education encourages anarchy – a breakdown of discipline in all senses: the
fear, as John Wilson puts it, is that when authority arrangements break down, fanaticism
is  given  free  rein  (Wilson,  1989).  The  right  also  objects  to  the  de-intellectualisation
inherent in an approach that gives such respect to experience: in particular, they believe
that  not  applying  the  intellect  to  ethical  questions  is  ultimately  disastrous  to  social
stability. R.S. Peters, for example, argues that education is an initiation into activities or
modes of thought that are intrinsically worthwhile, and so cannot be thought of merely
as experience, and cannot be rediscovered by each learner spontaneously (Peters, 1966).
Probably the best-known aphorism from this school of conservative critique of student-
centredness is Michael Oakeshott’s that education is a conversation between generations
(Oakeshott, 1989).
13 Note, however, that these objections are from the conservative right of an old sort, not
from the radical  right of  the kind that has come to power in many places in recent
decades. In fact, the right’s relationship to student-centred education is more complex
and ambivalent than the conservative critique would suggest. The first point to note is
that there has always been a strand of support for student-centredness that is located in a
quite different ideology from left-anarchism. The most obvious is in a concern of the late-
nineteenth and early  twentieth centuries  with moral  regeneration,  and a  belief  that
traditional schooling was not adequate to this task (Darling, 1981). For example, Cecil
Reddie, founder of Abbotsholme, far from being an anarchist, believed firmly in a natural
social hierarchy: for example, his revised version of the fifth Christian commandment
read: “they that despise, or treat ill, their parents, guardians or teachers, will suffer dire
remorse” (Darling, 1981, p. 18).
14 One of the best-known of these right-wing progressives was Kurt Hahn, a Jewish refugee
from Hitler, who founded the Gordonstoun school in northern Scotland in the 1930s. The
regime which he instituted there was aimed at cleansing young men, in stark contrast, for
example, to the sexual liberation of A.S. Neill’s Summerhill. Gordonstoun was favoured by
members of the British royal family, including the queen’s husband: it then led also to the
Duke  of  Edinburgh  Award,  which  still  today  tries  to  extend  the  same  muscular
development of a moral personality to adolescents more generally.
15 What appealed to such thinkers was the emphasis on experience, on moral training, and
on preparation for responsible citizenship. The new education seemed to them a welcome
counter to what they alleged was the excessively theoretical curriculum of the secondary
schooling that was emerging properly in most European countries at that time, and a
counter also to the rote-learning that had characterised elementary education in the
middle of the nineteenth century.
16 Moreover, this authoritarian progressivism was not confined to schooling: it appealed
strongly also to the nascent Boy Scouts movement of the years around the First World
War,  under the leadership of  Robert  Baden-Powell,  and slightly later the Girl  Guides
(Warren, 1986). The Scouting philosophy placed a great deal of emphasis on experiential
learning – for example, nature study and woodcraft. It sought to train young people’s
character  for  citizenship,  self-reliance,  self-improvement and public  service.  It  had a
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heavy emphasis on spiritual development. It was in fact firmly opposed to militarism, and
Baden-Powell refused to allow the Scouts in Britain to be used for military training during
the War;  that anti-militarism was part  of  its  support for self-reliance etc.  But it  was
equally strongly opposed to socialism in any form. It was, in short, a non-socialist form of
collectivism, anti-individualist, not even potentially or theoretically about freedom.
17 Once we see this right-wing version of student-centredness, and how it used experiential
learning in a thoroughly anti-intellectual way, we might be less surprised to discover a
Fascist version too (Entwistle,  1979).  In fact,  one of the earliest attempts to reform a
whole public-school system on child-centred lines was by Mussolini’s first Minister of
Public Instruction, Giovanni Gentile. The reform was managed by the director-general of
elementary  education,  Lombardo-Radice,  a  former  socialist.  Mussolini  described  this
reform as “the most fascist of all the fascist reforms”. The purpose was to liberate the
schools  from the  teaching  of  facts.  Religious  instruction  became  compulsory,  in  the
interests of promoting the spiritual development of the child. The examination system
was reformed to test  “creativity” rather than factual  knowledge.  And the whole was
rigorously meritocratic: at the end of elementary school, students were tested for entry
to secondary school or vocational school.
18 The reforms were praised as positive, vigorous and creative in many countries: we have
to recall that, to much mainstream opinion, “fascist” in the early 1920s had an aura of
“progressive” or “modern” (Oelkers, 2002). The education reforms, in particular, helped
to reinforce the sense in Italy that fascism was a liberation movement. Antonio Gramsci
was not among the enthusiasts, and we can anticipate a later stage in the argument by
noting that he predicted that child-centred progressivism would be friendly to political
authoritarianism,  the  veneration  of  experience  and  the  denigration  of  the  intellect
underpinning fascism’s denial of reason and its dependence on intoxicating pageantry:
indulging in activity for activity’s sake. Gramsci’s analysis points to the ambiguity in this
fascist legacy of the status of the individual:  apparently celebrating the individual,  it
actually subsumes the individual into the collective.
19 Now, we might be tempted to regard all these early twentieth century instances of right-
wing support for progressivism as quaint, superseded by the left-anarchist trajectory that
came to dominate after the 1940s. But the next step in the argument is that, in important
respects, the right-wing veneration of experiential learning has now come to dominate
educational policy. We can label this vocational progressivism because it has its origins in
the belief that the main purpose of education is to prepare people to be efficient workers.
It  is  based  ultimately  on  the  utopian  belief  that  human  beings  could  develop  an
unfettered  mode  of  existence  in  which  the  intellect  did  not  interfere  with  direct
experience, that old romantic idea that what was wrong with European civilisation was
the Aristotelian split between body and mind.
20 In  fact,  the  tenets  of  student-centredness  entered vocational  education early,  in  the
various attempts in the 1930s to use education to get unemployed young people into
work. It survived as a current in thinking about vocational education in the post-war
period.  But  the full  flowering did not  come till  the 1970s,  and has  continued to the
present. In the 1980s the philosophy of vocational education became student-centred,
with an emphasis on students’ discovering things for themselves, and with a hostility to
any kind of theory (Hartley, 1987, 2003). This accompanied a rejection of old styles of
apprenticeship, and a rejection of old ideas about “crafts”: the efficient worker had to be
flexible, and so what was required was competence in specific skills, not the induction
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into a craft. That kind of worker is more readily managed than a craftsman who has a
stable identity from which individual autonomy might spring. In one sense that is what
Marx,  Hegel  and Adam Smith were writing about  in their  concept  of  alienation:  the
separation of measurable capacities from the worker’s identity.
21 More recently, this ideology has fitted well with fashionable rhetoric about the nature of
the economy, requiring flexible specialisation, the economy allegedly requiring generic
workers.  Writers  such as  Zygmunt Bauman argue,  further,  that  work is  increasingly
governed by aesthetic criteria rather than by abstract theory. It is suggested that this new
economy and the new education preparing for it are associated with the rise to power of a
new professional class – software engineers, design specialists, media workers, purveyors
of  personal  finance  –  no  longer  gaining  its  authority  from  hierarchy  and  accepted
classifications of knowledge, but now much more dependent on flexible careers, more
interested in “identities” and “lifestyles” than status, and more inclined to see education
as being about a sort of playful experimentation than about disciplined learning (Power
et  al,  2003).  This  idea  about  a  new  professional  class  comes  ultimately  from  Basil
Bernstein,  who  defined  the  new middle  class  as  those  concerned  with  the  symbolic
ordering of society (Bernstein, 1975). David Hartley points out that the language used
here  is  remarkably  close  to  the  language  used  by  the  progressive  educationists  to
promote experience, creativity, and spontaneity in schooling. He also points out that the
same language can be used to celebrate consumerism, and indeed Paul Standish makes
the link to Lasch’s culture of narcissism (Standish, 1997).
22 The argument is, then, that the ideas of student-centred education entered vocational
education as part of a new way of inducting people into work: flexible competence rather
than socialisation into a craft identity. The more thorough argument is then that this
movement,  having started in the lower-status parts of vocational education,  has now
spread  to  embrace  almost  all  education.  School  and  university  curricula  have  been
reconstructed in the last twenty years to follow the same ideology. Following the ideas of
“mastery learning”, the syllabus has been decomposed into units, which are separately
assessed, often with no or minimal holistic assessment at the end of a course. The student
is as free as possible to assemble her or his own collection of units, because “disciplines”
are regarded as out-dated and alienating. There has been a gradual erosion of the role of
theory  and  of  abstract  knowledge,  and  a  growth  of  activity  learning,  experiential
learning, “emotional intelligence”, learning that is “relevant” to the life of the learner.
There has grown also the belief that students have to be motivated all the time – that
deferred  gratification  is  not  any  longer  a  sufficient  rationale  for  study  (and  almost
unfettered choice is part of this). And the outcomes of all this are increasingly seen as the
preparation of infinitely flexible workers for the “knowledge economy”. There is even a
new version of the “de-schooling” movement, in which the future is imagined to be free
of  educational  institutions:  they would be replaced by the internet  etc,  and teachers
would become “learning consultants” (Bentley, 1998).
23 That is not to say that everything has changed,  and that nothing of older models of
learning survives. But the re-modelling of education on experiential lines has gone very
far indeed. My main proposition is then that this has resulted from a progressivism of the
right, drawing upon the main tenets of student-centred utopianism to impose its own
utopia of experience, first of all on vocational education and, in the last two decades, on
the whole of education.
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Critique
24 Not everyone on the left regrets this shift, precisely because there are so many points of
contact  between  it  and  left-anarchist  progressivism.  In  the  UK,  the  most  notable
exponent of  that left-anarchist  view is  Stephen Ball,  professor of  education at  King’s
College in London, and highly influential on academic debates about education in the UK
(Ball,  1990; Brehony, 1992, 1997).  In the 1980s,  Ball  argued that the main educational
enemy  of  the  left  was  what  he  called  the  “cultural  restorationists”  or  – following
Raymond Williams – “old humanists”, who would roughly correspond to the conservative
critics  of  progressive pedagogy mentioned earlier.  Ball  then welcomed the sympathy
which many larger employers showed for the vocational progressivism, and saw this as a
way of reviving left-anarchist progressivism and of radically reconstructing schooling
whether vocational or not: typical of his comments are that “vocational progressivism” is
“set over against the elitist conceptions of knowledge proselytised by the old humanists”.
25 Ball’s view is now the dominant one on the left, and so the left has no developed basis for
offering a critique of the current reconstruction of the curriculum. It seems to be rather
meekly accepting that because current reforms are couched in terms of “freedom” and
“flexibility”,  then they must  be  welcome to  the left;  and the left  also  seem to  have
accepted that the only kind of education that can prepare people for work is the kind that
has  been  put  in  place  in  the  past  two  decades,  with its  rejection  of  theory  and  its
celebration of flexibility spontaneity.
26 We might do well, then, to return to what Gramsci had to say about Mussolini’s reforms:
“the  struggle  against  capital”,  he  wrote,  requires  that  “‘knowing’  […]  supersedes
‘spontaneity’”,  giving  “the  worker  the  understanding  of  the  conditions  in  which  he
struggles, of the fundamental tendencies which operate in the system of relationships, of
the processes of development which society undergoes to sustain within itself irreducible
antagonisms” (Entwistle, 1979). Understanding all this requires propositional knowledge,
embedded in theories and emerging out of a tradition of intellectual engagement.
27 So we can summarise a left critique of progressivism under five headings:
 
Spontaneity is not enough
28 John Dewey,  having doubts  about  the most  radical  versions  of  experiential  learning,
acknowledged that children cannot develop truth out of their own minds (Dewey, 1902):
“nothing can be developed from nothing, nothing but the crude can be developed out of
the crude,  and this  is  surely what  happens when we throw the child back upon his
achieved self  as  a  finality”.  Any education worthy of  the  name requires  students  to
engage with the  unfamiliar,  the  “not  relevant”.  Related to  this  is  the  celebration of
emotion over reason, which is dangerous to thought in many more mundane ways than
Gramsci observed from the Italian fascists. It has been argued, in fact, that basing an
educational philosophy on the experience of students replaces the authoritarianism of
the teacher with the authoritarianism of the learner, who becomes the only arbiter of
what  is  worth  knowing  (Walter,  1996).  So  this  first  element  of  the  left  critique  of
progressivism is  an educational  instance of  the general  left  critique of  the romantic
naivety of what has been called 1960s radicalism (including existentialism).
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Social control
29 The second element of the critique is that the new right’s final endorsement of student-
centredness tends to confirm Walkerdine’s  point that  this  form of  pedagogy offers a
convenient kind of social control: as with utopian criminology, the classification of stages
of development, etc., came to be closely linked to regulation of development. Sharp and
Green described progressive teaching, like social work, as a means of socialising people
through “soft psychological technology” (Sharp and Green, 1975). It manages aspirations
by legitimising a wider range of “learning styles” and hence of assessments: “modern
child-centred education is an aspect of romantic radical conservatism which involves an
emotional turning away from society”. In Basil Bernstein’s terms, it is an “invisible” form
of  control,  in  contrast  to  explicit,  hierarchical  kinds.  So,  despite  the  rhetoric  of
individuality, this pedagogy is actually opposed to the development of any coherent and
stable kind of individual autonomy. It is not aimed at developing or shaping autonomous
individuals, but at the manipulation of experience by means of measurable outcomes.
 
Learning as social
30 The  romantic  individualism  of  student-centredness  ignores  the  intrinsically  social
character of worthwhile learning – the extent to which learning has to be an initiation
into a community of knowledge, even when Oakeshott’s “conversation” becomes more
like an argument (a point which, it should be said, he acknowledges). The best-known
exponent  of  this  idea  is  Lev  Semenovich  Vygotsky  (1896-1934),  who  proposed  the
importance of formal learning for any advanced understanding (Gee, 1996).
31 This point is not so much prescriptive as descriptive. As a matter of fact the children of
the bourgeoisie will be socialised through their families into forms of knowledge that will
give them power (as Pierre Bourdieu repeatedly argued). So not to teach explicitly, and to
rely on knowledge developing spontaneously through experience, would be merely to
further privilege those who are already privileged. Again, student-centredness is only
superficially  individualistic.  Because  it  abstracts  the  individual  from social  relations,
student-centredness has no conception of how to educate the individual into a critical
relationship to a tradition.  By thus allowing the learner to be ignorant of  structural
impediments to learning, student-centredness actually negates individual autonomy.
 
Understanding society
32 The fourth element notes that it is really not surprising that progressivism has become
the  dominant  educational  ideology  because,  following  Gramsci,  it  seems  clear  that
understanding social development requires facts, theory and knowledge. Being truly free
requires a capacity to recognise the threats to freedom, and also an understanding of
what kinds of human activity are possible. That requires knowledge of cultural variety,
and of social change. The current vogue for students’ learning how to be flexible workers
etc. because society is changing so rapidly has nothing to say about how society ought to
change: the learner is not provided with a secure centre of identity from which a critique
of social change (or anything else) could emerge.
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33 In this element of the critique, we can give particular attention to the critique of “de-
schooling”. Herbert Gintis noted long ago (Gintis, 1972) that Ivan Illich celebrates the
small-scale  entrepreneur,  the  person  who  has  become  the  hero  of  current  political
writing about flexible specialisation. Gintis also predicted that if anything like Illich’s de-
schooled  Utopia  came  about,  it  would  serve  merely  a  utilitarian  and  individualistic
conception  of  humanity:  “a  commodity-fetishist  cafeteria-smorgasbord  ideal  of
education”. That excoriation seems remarkably prescient of the long-term consequences
of “mastery learning”, in the burgeoning catalogues of “learning modules” which issue
from almost all educational institutions today.
 
Freedom achieved through education
34 The final element of the critique is a more general version of the fourth. Knowledge and
understanding  are  pre-requisites  of  freedom,  and  so  freedom  is  achieved  through
education,  not  necessarily  within  it.  That  process  might  be  difficult,  might  defer
gratification, and might require engagement with the thought and style of others: but the
key point  is  that  the process is  de-centred.  Ken Jones put  this  well  at  the height of
Thatcherism in the UK, accepting as long ago as 1983 that it was not enough for the left to
defend 1960s progressivism: “an education that substitutes for knowledge of nature and
society a programme of socialisation and self-realisation of the entirely nugatory sort […]
is incorrectly founded.”
35 Student-centred  education  is  best  known as  a  utopia  of  the  left,  specifically  of  left-
anarchism. I have argued in this essay that it should also be understood as a utopia of the
right, in its veneration of experience over propositional knowledge, in its celebration of
the  emotions  over  reason,  and  in  its  encouragement  of  spontaneity  over  intelligent
activism. It is utopian insofar as it imagines a human being unencumbered by an intellect,
whose will is spontaneously regulated by accumulated experience, and whose relations
with  others  are  unmediated  by  rational  calculation,  or  by  any  coherent  and  stable
identity.
36 In important respects, this utopianism of the right has become one of the right’s most
successful hegemonic projects in the past two decades, more insidious, more insistent,
and more successful in meeting its own aims than any of the attempts at educational
privatisation.  This  change  is  little-noticed  but  now  pervading  education  in  many
countries at all levels, in its fragmentation of the curriculum into modular units, in its
precise  specification  of  learning  outcomes  as  the  behavioural  consequences  of  these
modules, in its promotion of student choice over engagement with a canon, and in its
systematic denial of the importance of theory.
37 The right has achieved this partly as utopian ideology but mainly as economics. It has
successfully established in public debate that the nature of the economy requires this
kind of flexible specialisation. And the left has been largely powerless to resist because it
has mistaken this right-anarchism for liberation, and has forgotten that spontaneity and
experience are no substitute for the development of secure identity through rational,
voluntary immersion in a community of learning.
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